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Abstract
Behavioral Law and Economics has become an increasingly prominent field within legal
scholarship, and most recently within the corporate area. A behavioral bias of particular relevance
in corporate contexts is the differential between individuals’ willingness to pay to obtain a legal
entitlement and her willingness to accept to part with one, known as the “endowment effect.”
Should endowment effects pervade relationships within business organizations, it would significantly
complicate much of the common wisdom within corporate law, such as the presumed optimality of
ex ante voluntary agreements. Existing experimental research, however, does not adequately
address whether and to what extent the endowment effect operates within corporate environments.
This Article presents an experimental test for endowment effects within a principal-agent
relationship that typifies many firms. We find that subjects situated in an agency relationship do not
exhibit a significant endowment effect. Using an additional experimental test, we argue that this
dampening phenomenon is likely due to the fact that the agency context induces subjects to view
property rights principally for their exchange value, thereby causing them to “disendow” their
initial legal entitlements.
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INTRODUCTION
n recent years, behavioral law and economics (BLE) has risen to prominence within legal
scholarship. Its ascension is due -- at least in part -- to its aim of unifying two historically
distinct analytic paradigms: economics and psychology. While embracing the conventional
economic premise that legal rules embody behavior-altering incentives, behavioral law and
economics nevertheless disengages from neoclassical economic theory, adopting an account of
human behavior in which people display numerous systematic, cognitive biases at variance with
the predictions of rational choice theory.
BLE has fostered renewed academic skepticism about central tenets of law and economics
that depend on strong rationality assumptions.1 This skepticism poses an important challenge to
conventional corporate law scholarship, much of which is premised on the Coasean prediction that
– in the absence of significant externalities, information asymmetries, or garden-variety transaction
costs – the law can (and should) rely on private parties to allocate rights and obligations optimally.2
This prediction leads naturally to the prescription that corporate law should generally avoid
imposing immutable (or “mandatory”) rules, except when necessary to address conventional
market failures, and thus should be primarily confined to two tasks: (i) providing default rules that
most rational corporate stakeholders would tend to favor ex ante, and (ii) providing doctrines for
interpreting parties’ endeavors to contract around the default rules.3 By casting doubt on the
accuracy of strong rationality assumptions, BLE raises the serious possibility that notwithstanding
market failures, privately negotiated organizational relationships systematically diverge from
efficiency. And, if such deviations are persistent, then the normative case for mandatory regulation
is significantly larger than the conventional economic approach suggests -- resting not only on
previously articulated market-failure considerations, but also on some form of measured
paternalism.4

I

1

For informative reviews of this literature, see Donald Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and
Decisionmaking in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 1499 (1998); Christine Jolls,
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998);
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein, ed., 2000).

2

See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS 1 (1960).

3

See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991);
SYMPOSIUM: CONTRACTUAL FREEDOM IN CORPORATE LAW, 89 Columbia Law Review 1395 (1989). For a variation
on this theme, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal
Rules, 101 YALE LAW JOURNAL 729 (1992) and Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities Into Gold: A Strategic
Analysis of the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 108 YALE LAW JOURNAL 277 (1998).

4

Recent efforts discussing the relevance of BLE for corporate law or securities law include Stephen Bainbridge, A
Behavioral Economic Analysis of Mandatory Disclosure, 68 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW 1023 (2000);
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1735 (2001); James Cox and Harry Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 83
(1985); Robert Haft, Business Decisions By the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICHIGAN LAW
REVIEW 1 (1981); Henry Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA LAW REVIEW
277 (1990); Donald Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market
Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 101 (1997); Donald
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Although BLE spotlights a number of non-rational biases, one which has particular
relevance for corporate scholarship is the frequently observed divergence between willingness to
pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). While rational actor models generally assume that
mere ownership or possession of an asset does not influence an individual’s valuation of it (once
one controls for wealth and income effects), an increasing body of empirical and experimental
evidence demonstrates that possession can affect value. Specifically, the maximum amount a nonowner would be willing to pay for an entitlement is often significantly less than the minimum
amount she would demand to part with it if she initially owned it. This divergence between
willingness to pay and willingness to accept has become known as the “endowment effect.”5
The presence of endowment effects within firms would have important implications for
legal rules governing business organizations. As noted above, it would undermine the premise of
the Coase theorem that free, fully informed, unimpeded private bargaining necessarily results in
the efficient distribution of property rights. Rather, an entitlement may remain “stuck” with its
initial owner, even though another would value the entitlement more if she were initially endowed
with it.6 As applied to specifically corporate scholarship, endowment effects undercut the widespread presumption that the “nexus of contracts” voluntarily entered into by informed parties is
presumptively welfare maximizing, both immediately before and after execution. Indeed, this
presumption leans heavily on preference stability – and in particular that initial possession does not
affect valuation. When, in contrast, endowment does affect valuation, the agreements people enter
into before they become endowed need not equate to those that maximize their welfare
immediately once becoming endowed.7 Such a finding would have obvious implications for
corporate law, since most corporate governance agreements are often executed prior to endowment,

Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons For Law From Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and
Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 627 (1996); Larry Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, 24
JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW 869 (1999).
5

See generally RICHARD THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIIC LIFE, 63-78
(1992).

6

See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic
Implications, 71 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY. 59, 99 (1993); Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler,
Experimental Tests, supra note 17. Indeed, the endowment effect undermines -- or at least complexifies – the concept
of social welfare itself, making it difficult to define the cost and benefit of reallocating an entitlement. See Hoffman &
Spitzer, supra, at 103-112; see also Edward McCaffery, Daniel Kahneman, and Matthew Spitzer, Framing the Jury:
Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 3141 (1995).

7

The endowment effect is particularly likely to have an adverse effect on bargaining if, as evidence suggests, buyers
and sellers do not fully anticipate the effect on either themselves. See George Loewenstein and Daniel Adler, A Bias
in the Prediction of Tastes, 105 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 929 (1995)(suggesting people do not anticipate their own
endowment effects); Leaf Van Boven, David Dunning, George Loewenstein, Trading Places: Egocentric Empathy Gaps
Between Otehrs and Buyers (unpublished manuscript 2000)(suggesting owners and buyers overestimate the similarity
between their own valuation of an objects and that of others).
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and yet govern the parties’ relationship subsequent to one (or more) parties becoming endowed.8
Thus, unanticipated endowment effects might undercut the existing rationale behind judicial
deference toward corporate charters over later governance agreements (such as bylaws, collective
bargaining agreements, and shareholder proposals).9 In addition, unanticipated endowment effects
in managerial positions might provide insight into why managers of public corporations agree in
good faith to charters that do not contain takeover defenses, only to seek the subsequent
implementation of such defenses.10
While widespread endowment effects would clearly have important implications for
corporate law, any serious effort to incorporate endowment effects into normative policy
prescriptions must contend with a problem of domain uncertainty. Existing evidence on the
endowment effect suggests that it is pronounced in certain circumstances, but fails to manifest in
others. Much like other deviations from rational choice, the existence and magnitude of the
endowment effect is context dependent.11 Moreover, neither theory nor existing experimental
evidence yields robust predictions as to whether people will manifest the endowment effect within
business organizations. Thus, before commencing with normative or prescriptive theories based
on the endowment effect, it is important first to ascertain whether the phenomenon transcends into
the business organizational context.
This Article provides an experimental test of whether the endowment effect affects
individual choices within business agency relationships: i.e., the“principal-agent” relationships that
populate many business organizations.12 Specifically, we modify the classic endowment effect
experiments to determine whether subjects situated in a business agency context display
endowment effects in contracting with their employer. This is the first testof whether agents

8

Of course, a normative utilitarian analysis allowing for endogenous preferences thus must specify a time frame at
which welfare-relevant preferences are deemed to “matter” for efficiency computations (pre- or post-endowment).

9

Similarly, in the employment area, scholars have argued that endowment effects undermine the presumed validity
of employment-at-will, on the grounds that, ex ante, employees voluntarily agree to an at-will employment relationship
only because they fail to anticipate that, once employed, they will endow their positions, and thus value them more.
Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of Common Law, 74 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1783,
1800-1803 (1996); see Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 U. VA. L. REV. 205 (2001) (arguing
in the context of at-will doctrines that “[s]o long as the right is initially allocated to one or another side, an endowment
effect cannot be avoided”).

10

Cf. John Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STANFORD
LAW REVIEW 307, 362-364 (2000) (arguing that the bidder’s manager’s endowment effect in the target may partially
explain lock-ups).
11

See, generally, Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VANDERBILT
LAW REVIEW 1765, 1777-1781 (1998); Cass Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW
REVIEW 1175, 1180 (1997).
12

To be sure, legal rules regulate may types of agency problem, but we concentrate solely on the canonical “employeremployee” relationship within firms.
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manifest an endowment effect in exchanges with their employers, to our knowledge.13
Our central finding is that situating subjects in an agency context significantly dampens the
magnitude (and indeed even the existence) of the endowment effect. Specifically, although our
control subjects manifested an endowment effect similar to that detected in prior literature, our
agency subjects manifested virtually no endowment effect whatsoever. This result holds even
when we control for demographic differences among subjects.
We then conducted an experiment to assess why agency relationships mute the endowment
effect. The existing evidence yields two central hypotheses as to why agency relationships might
mute the endowment effect: (1) the agency relationship may cause subjects to focus on the
exchange value of the asset, as opposed to its use value (which should mute endowment effects
given evidence that subjects typically fail to manifest the effect for entitlements they hold primarily
for exchange purposes), and (2) the agency relationship may mute endowment effects if agents
exhibit other-regarding preferences towards the firm which cause them to disendow their own
assets when needed by the firm. As our initial agency experiment design implicates both of these
reasons, we ran a second agency experiment which was designed to implicate exchange-value
concerns but not to given rise to significant firm-regarding concerns. Again, we found no
statistically significant evidence of an endowment effect. These results are not only consistent with
the findings of our initial agency experiment, but also suggest that the business context itself
caused subjects to focus on the exchange value of the asset, thereby eliminating any statistically
significant endowment effect.
Our results have both specific and general implications. Most directly, they counsel a
degree of caution for those involved in developing normative policy prescriptions for corporate or
employment law based on endowment effects. More generally, our results underscore an important
tension between context-specific experimental research and broad-based normative inquiries,
highlighting the need for experimental inquiries targeted to each specific policy domain.
Nevertheless, while we did not find evidence of an endowment effect in a corporate agency
context, this does not imply that corporate scholars can ignore behavioral economics altogether.
On the contrary, there remains considerable evidence that certain cognitive biases profoundly affect
some agency relationships. Thus, increased attention to cognitive biases by corporate scholars
seems prudent, if accompanied by both a prudent dose of caution and, ideally, more primary
research into the area.14 Along these same lines, it is important to note that our analysis is largely
limited to agency relationships that resemble the employer-employee relationship. It may certainly
be the case that in other types of agency relationship, the endowment effect resurfaces with
significant force.
Our discussion consists of three parts. Section I reviews the empirical evidence and theories
13

Previous analysis has shown that agents do not manifest endowment effects when acting on behalf of their principal
in exchanges involving the principal’s assets. See James D. Marshall, Jack L. Knetsch, and J.A. Sinden, Agents’
Evaluations and the Disparity in Measures of Economic Loss, 7 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION
115 (1986). This could arise because agents fail to anticipate their principal’s endowment effects. By contrast, we
examine agents’ behavior when contracting on their own behalf.
14

See, e.g., sources in infra note 79, and the literature discussed in Donald Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra
note 4.
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underlying the endowment effect, focusing on current literature. Section II describes our control
and initial agency experiments and presents our results. Section III presents the results of our
“exchange value” agency experiment, tentatively positing some implications that may flow
therefrom.

I. ENDOWMENT EFFECTS: EXISTING THEORY AND EVIDENCE
This section examines the existing evidence on the endowment effect to assess its
implications for corporate law scholarship. We find that there is considerable evidence that people
manifest this bias in a number of different circumstances, including in certain market settings.
Nevertheless, both the theory and evidence present reasons to expect that corporate participants
(employees, managers, and shareholders) might not generally manifest this effect in their intra-firm
exchanges.

A. Evidence of the Endowment Effect
A vast experimental and theoretical literature exists on the endowment effect. The classic
experiment demonstrating the endowment effect involved Cornell coffee mugs, which sold at the
nearby university bookstore for approximately $6 (as was indicated by price tags on the bottom of
the mug). The experimenters randomly distributed the mugs to half of their subjects. Each
participant was then told she could sell/buy a mug by stating a sale/purchase price which was then
given to the experimenters. The experimenters then determined the market clearing price, and all
those who made offers equal to or above that price participated in an exchange.
Economic theory predicts that, since the mugs were distributed randomly, half the mugs
would trade, moving from those who valued mugs less to those who valued them more. Yet in
fact, few mugs traded because on average those endowed with the mugs valued them significantly
more than those who were not endowed. Indeed, while the median buyer was not willing to pay
more than $2.25-$2.75 to purchase the mug, the median seller required $5.25 to part with her mug.
Thus, in apparent contrast with rational choice theory, evidence suggested that each mug owner
came to value the mug more simply because she now owned it.15
Efforts to discredit the basic endowment effect result have largely failed.16 Indeed,
experimental evidence of the effect has now transcended numerous experimental settings, using
a variety of items -- such as coffee mugs, chocolate bars, and pens -- as well as subjects from
15

This result could not be fully explained by wealth effects, as the mugs did not significantly affect the participants’
total wealth. Nor was it likely the product of transactions costs, as equivalent mugs were easily available a short
distance away at the campus bookstore. See generally Id.

16

Indeed, a recent ambitious analysis of the existing evidence based on combined data from 45 existing studies found
that both experimental tests and empirical studies of real world choices consistently reveal evidence of an endowment
effect. John K. Horowitz and Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, Department of Agricultural and
Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park MD 20742-5535 (October 2000).
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different countries.17 The endowment effect also persists when subjects are repeat players within
the experiment.18 Similarly, empirical studies of real world exchanges also reveal evidence of an
endowment effect.19 Thus, the endowment effect appears to be a genuine phenomenon, and not
simply the product of faulty experimental design.

B. Scope of the Endowment Effect
Existing evidence that individuals frequently exhibit endowment effects does not
necessarily imply that corporate law must take this effect into account, however. Evidence that
people can exhibit endowment effect does not mean that they invariably do so. Indeed, quite the
contrary: the existing evidence suggests that people display endowment effects in some
circumstances but do not do so in others.20 This raises the issue, do endowment effects exist within
the corporate context?
Existing theoretical explanations for the endowment effect, unfortunately, do not enable
us to predict confidently when the effect will arise. Economists, psychologists, legal scholars, and
others have offered alternative (and often overlapping) explanations for the endowment effect, each
of which may have a claim to some veracity. These different theories produce different domains
for the endowment effect, as well as different implications for legal policy.
Indeed, some theorists argue that one can account for the WTA/WTP differential within the
conventional rational-actor paradigm.21 Perhaps the best known of these rational actor explanations
posits that the WTA/WTP difference occurs when individuals perceive the good to partially unique
(e.g., not to have a perfect consumption substitute) and are unable to easily trade the good through
market transactions. This explanation predicts that the effect should not occur if a good has perfect
substitutes, or if thick markets in the good exist such that individuals can treat the good first and
17

See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1325 (1990)[hereinafter Kahneman, et. al., Experimental Test];
Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & Richard Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and Status Quo Bias, 5
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 193 (Winter, 1993) [hereinafter Kahneman, et. al., Endowment Effect].

18

See Jason F. Shogren, Seung Y. Shin, Dermont J. Hayes, and James B. Kleibenstein, Resolving Differences in
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept, 84 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 255 (1994) (repeated markets utilizing
incentive compatible bidding systems does not eliminate the endowment effect for nonmarket goods).

19

In fact, the evidence suggests that the endowment effect manifested by the public generally exceeds that manifested
by the college students. See Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 15.

20

See generally Arlen, supra note 11, at 1777-78; Jeffrey Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology
of Ownership, 51Vanderbilt Law Review 1549, 1557 (1998).

21

See W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ? 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 635 (1991); see also Lorne Carmichael & Bentley Macleod, Caring About Sunk Costs: A Behavioral
Solution to the Hold-Up Problem (unpublished manuscript) (deriving a unique equilibrium that ensures efficiency in
holdup models); Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Market Signaling of Personal Characteristics, John M.
Olin Law & Economics Working Paper Number 87 (2nd Series), University of Chicago, The Law School.
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foremost as a simple store of value, rather than as a consumption good with some uniqueness
attributes.22
If the uniqueness hypothesis were accurate, it would be much easier to predict the
endowment effect, because then the phenomenon would co-vary with other objectively verifiable
factors, such as the presence of thick markets in a good. Yet existing experimental evidence lends
only partial support for the uniqueness conjecture.23 In particular, although individuals tend to
exhibit no WTA/WTP differential for goods that have only an exchange value (such as money),24
and exhibit only a modest one for “ordinary market goods,”25 most evidence indicates that the
presence of close substitutes merely reduces, but generally does not eliminate, the WTA/WTP
differential.26 Thus, the endowment effect apparently is not simply a product of nonsubstitutability.27
22

Hanemann, supra note 20.

23

See, e.g., Horowitz and McConnell, supra note 15 (broad literature survey suggests that, on average, the less the
good is like an “ordinary market good,” the higher is the WTA/WTP ratio).

24

The best individual evidence for this generalization comes from experiments on “securities” – paper instruments
created by experimenters that have no value other than to be redeemed for cash, frequently after some random event
(such as drawing a ball from an urn) determines the amount. Broadly construed, such experiments suggest that when
comparing securities and cash, WTA and WTP tend strongly to converge. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note
16; Peter Knez, et. al., Individual Rationality, Market Rationality, and Value Estimation, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 397
(1985); Harinder Singh, The Disparity Between Willingness To Pay and Compensation Demanded: Another Look at
Laboratory Evidence, 35 ECON. LETTERS 263 (1991); Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, The Disparity
Between Willingness to Pay Versus Willingness to Accept as a Framing Effect, in FRONTIERS OF MATHEMATICAL
PSYCHOLOGY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CLYDE COOMBS (Donald R. Brown & J.E. Keith Smith eds., 1991).
25

See Shogren, Shin, Hayes, & Kleibenstein, supra note 17; see also D. Harless, More Laboratory Evidence on the
Disparity Between WPT and Compensation Demanded, 11 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION 359
(May 1989).

26

See, e.g., Wiktor L. Adamowicz, Vinay Bhardwaj, and Bruce Macnab, Experiments on the Difference Between
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept, 69 LAND ECONOMICS 416, 425 (1993)(finding that WTA/WTP is larger
for nonmarket goods than for market goods, but nevertheless finding a WTA/WTP differential for all types of goods).
In addition, some scholars cite experimental evidence of a difference between WTA and WTP for lotteries as
evidence that the endowment effect operates for market goods. See, e.g., Jack Knetsch and J.A. Sinden, Willingness
to Pay and Compensation Demand: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 507 (1994) (finding a WTA/WTP differential for lottery/raffle tickets with small
stakes). Question arise, however, whether the lottery valuation results are driven by endowment effects or by biases in
the evaluation of uncertain choices, however. See Don Coursey, John Hovis, William Schulze, The Disparity Between
Willingness to Accept and Willingness to Pay Measures of Value, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 679, 680
(1987).

27

Additional evidence exists which is inconsistent with rational choice explanations for the endowment effect. For
example, subjects who are only given a voucher that can later be exchanged for a mug – and not the actual mug – exhibit
a weak endowment effect. See Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 16, at 1342 n. 7. (1990). In addition, the
evidence suggests that duration of ownership appears to affect valuation -- even when duration does not convey new

ENDOWMENT EFFECTS AND CORPORATE AGENTS

8

Cognitive psychologists tend to attribute the endowment effect not to traditional rational
choice, but rather to “loss aversion” — the tendency for people to attach greater importance to
losses than to gains.28 While descriptively powerful, this psychological explanation does little to
predict when the effect will occurs in practice: simply concluding that a person “endowed” with
a good exhibits loss aversion adds little to our understanding of which circumstances induce a
person to “endow” a good in the first instance.29
Some have attempted to give additional content to the concept of loss aversion by
conjecturing that subjects exhibit loss aversion -- even with respect to a university coffee mug they
have held for only a short time -- because they consider the future use value of this particular mug.
This might ground loss aversion largely in the attributes of the object in the subject’s possession -its future use value.
Yet the evidence suggests, however, that whether a subject endows an object depends as
much on the psychological context of the choice than on any objective aspects of the asset. For
example, researchers have found that subjects’ psychological sense of “endowment” depends not
only on the legal fact of ownership, but also on whether subjects feel their ownership of the good
has an independent moral justification. Subjects who were told they had “earned” -- or deserved -an object exhibited more of an endowment effect than those who were told they had won the object
in a game of chance.30 Nevertheless, the evidence does suggest that whether an object is viewed
primarily for its consumption value or its exchange value does affect the endowment effect,
although this can depend as much on the context of the exchange as on the attributes of the asset.

information about the good. Michael Strahilevitz & George Lowenstein, THE EFFECT OF PAST OWNERSHIP ON THE
VALUATION OF OBJECTS (unpublished manuscript).
28

See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model,
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1039, 1041-44 (1991). Interestingly, it is possible to incorporate the concept of
loss aversion into the conventional utilitarian account of preferences by introducing a “kink” in an individual’s
indifference curve induced by the status quo. See Gwendolyn C. Morrison, Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay
and Willingness to Accept: Comment, 87 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 236 (1997); Gwendolyn C. Morrison,
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: Some Evidence of an Endowment Effect, 29 APPLIED ECONOMICS 411
(1997).

29

See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 11, at 1777-78;. Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 19, at 1557; Cass Sunstein,
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1175, 1180 (1997). Given the uncertain domain
of the effect, and the resulting need for experimental analysis, we need not take any position in this paper as to which
theory best explains the endowment effect. Each leave open the question of “under what circumstances do subjects feel
endowed?” This experiment is designed to shed additional light on this issue.

30

See George Loewenstein and Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence in the Valuation of Objects,7 JOURNAL OF
BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 157 (1994) (reporting this result in an experiment with coffee mugs); see also Elizabeth
Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts
of Distributive Justice, 14 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 259 (1985) (telling subjects they were entitled to an object
affected their willingness to behave selfishly in exercising their property rights in different circumstances); and
Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon Smith, Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity
in Bargaining Games, 7 GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 346 (1994) (same).
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For example, a field experiment testing subjects’ willingness to trade sports memorabilia found that
while nondealers generally manifested a significant endowment effect in sports memorabilia,
dealers in sports memorabilia did not. Nevertheless, nondealers with substantial trading experience
behaved more like dealers than like other nondealers.31 Thus, subjects who may endow a particular
good in a context where its consumption value is salient, may not do so in other contexts,
particularly if they have come to focus on its exchange value.

C. Implications for Agency Relationships
The existing literature thus leaves unresolved the issue of whether business agents likely
manifest endowment effects in intra-firm exchanges. On the one hand, evidence that people
manifest endowment effects with respect to University coffee mugs even when told they are buyers
and sellers suggests the endowment effect may exist in a business context.32 On the other hand,
the experimental evidence provides two reasons to expect that perhaps agents do not manifest
endowment effects in intra-firm exchanges.
First, the evidence that subjects typically fail to manifest the effect for entitlements they
hold primarily for exchange purposes raises the possibility that endowment effects will not arise
in intra-firm exchanges if those entering agency relationships view their contractual rights
primarily for their exchange value (“exchange value hypothesis”).33
Second, evidence that subjects are less likely to endow an asset to which they do not feel
“entitled” suggests that agents might not manifest an endowment effect if a sense of loyalty or
obligation to the firm mutes their sense of entitlement (“shared entitlement” hypothesis).34 In
particular, agents might not endow if entering into an agency relationship causes them to feel the
firm in entitled to the assets implicated in the relationship, resulting in a sense of shared or
incomplete entitlement.35 This would be particularly likely to mute the endowment effect where
an agent’s decision whether to keep the asset affects the firm’s welfare.
To assess these possibilities, we conducted an experimental test with subjects situated in
an agency context. It is to this analysis we now turn.
31

John List, The Effect of Market Experience on the WTA/WTP Disparity: Evidence from a Field Experiment with
Sports Memorabilia (unpublished draft) (April 11, 2000).

32

See Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 16, at 1337-1338.

33

The Exchange value hypothesis -- that situating subjects in an agency context might mute the endowment effect
by causing them to focus on its exchange value -- is potentially consistent with evidence that situating subjects in a
hypothetical “business” context mutes other-regarding behavior. See Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, supra note
29, at Table II, page 357; K. Binmore et. al, Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study, 75
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1178 (1985).

34
35

See Loewenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 29.

This would be particularly likely to the extent that agents manifest other regarding preferences towards their
principal, as fiduciary duty law asserts they should (but economic principal-agent models generally assume they do not).
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II. THE EXPERIMENT
To examine whether agency relationships alter the endowment effect, we conducted a series
of experiments to test the robustness of the endowment effect result to situating subjects in an
agency relationship involving intra-firm exchanges. In each set of experiments, subjects were
differentiated by whether they were endowed with an asset at the beginning of the experiment or
not. The initial “control” experiment replicated prior experiments on the endowment effect.
Subjects participating in this experiment exhibited significant endowment effects consistent with
prior research. We then conducted a pair of “agency” experiments in which subjects were told they
were to be employed by a for-profit firm, and that they would face a choice between
keeping/obtaining the tangible good and receiving higher monetary wages. They also were told
that the good was a potential factor of production for the firm and that the firm’s profits would be
higher if it used the good. After choosing whether to join the firm, those that did then determined
whether to keep/retain the asset or obtain a pre-specified higher monetary wage (with endowed
subjects deciding whether to give up the asset and unendowed subjects deciding whether to take
the firm’s asset). We determined the subjects’ WTA or WTP by eliciting their willingness to
exchange the mug for money (the higher wage offered varied), conditioned on whether they were
initially endowed. Our central finding is that, in contrast with our control subjects, our agency
subjects did not manifest a statistically significant endowment effect. This is evidence of a
significant interaction between endowment effects and the principal-agent context which operates
to mute -- perhaps eliminate -- the endowment effect. This section describes these experiments and
presents our results.

A. Experimental Procedures
The experiment involved a total of 180 subjects: 35 participated in a control experiment
establishing the endowment effect in a traditional setting, and the remaining 145 subjects
participated in a series of experiments designed to explicitly test for endowment effects in agency
relationships. All subjects were first-year students at USC Law School who participated either in
the three weeks before entering law school or in the first few weeks of their first semester of law
school.36 The subjects were roughly equally divided between men and women, with 94 women in
our total pool of 180. All subjects were assigned a subject I.D., and were truthfully informed that
all data were to be recorded only by subject I.D. number, thereby preserving anonymity.37
As in the classic endowment effect experiments, our subjects were randomly divided
between those who were endowed with a university (USC) coffee mug at the beginning of the
36

The final experiments were run in Fall, 2000. We also collected data on a different, earlier, version of the
experiment run between in March and May, 1999, with over 100 second- and third-year students comprising the subject
pool. The results of that prior experiment appear largely consistent with those we report here.

37

Throughout the main part of the experiment (when subjects were deciding on whether to exchange the mug) the
experimenters stayed in the front of the room where we could monitor the progress of the experiment but could not see
the subjects’ answers to specific questions.
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experiment, and those who were not. Consistent with the literature, the identical mugs were
purchased from the nearby campus bookstore, sported a familiar school logo, and were clearly
labeled as being available at the bookstore for $5.95.38 We selected university mugs over other
possible tangible assets because prior work had already established a relatively reliable baseline
for such mugs. Thus mugs were particularly suited to testing the robustness of prior results to
situating subjects in a business agency relationship.39
To ensure that all subjects understood the experiment, each received a written description
of the experiment at the outset. We also read this description aloud. In addition, in the agency
experiments, each subject participated in two practice rounds of the experiment following the
description and then answered a series of questions which tested whether the subject understood
the experiment. (At the beginning of the experiment we told subjects that they would not be
permitted to complete the experiment if they could not answer the test questions adequately).40
In all experiments, each endowed subject was given a mug at the very beginning of the
experiment, prior to the consent form being read. The mug rested in front of the subject for the
approximately thirty minutes of explanation and testing prior to the subjects participating in the
main part of the experiment, and remained with the subjects during the experiment. Previous
experiments have shown this is more than long enough to produce an endowment effect.41 The
unendowed subjects were shown a mug at the beginning of the experiment but were not endowed

38

Easy availability is important to ensure that we are testing endowment effects, as opposed to the transactions costs
to an endowed subject of obtaining another mug should she sell one in this experiment.

39

We employed a mug because previous literature has shown the endowment effect is sensitive to the type of asset
used. Thus, to help ensure that any results we obtain were the product of a change in context -- as opposed to a change
in the type of asset -- we employed the same asset as previous experiments. Needless to say, had we found an
endowment effect, we would then have needed run additional experiments with assets that more closely approximate
those involved in business agency relationships before we could conclude that the endowment effect affects agents
exchanges with their employers. While such a research agenda is worthwhile, we concluded that at this point the more
pressing policy issue is to determine the degree to which experimental results are robust to being situated in the agency
context.

40

Prior to beginning the formal experiment, each subject also answered a series of demographic questions -- including
age, gender, race, marital status (single, married, co-habiting), number of siblings, whether English was the subject’s
native language, undergraduate major, and a question designed to measure their attitude toward risk. This information
was on a sheet of paper identified only with the subject’s I.D. We coded for gender because it has been shown to
influence endowment effects in other settings. See, e.g., Michael Strahilevitz and George Lowenstein, Gender
Differences in the Effect of Duration of Ownership on Object Valuation (unpublished manuscript, 2000). We coded
other demographic variables because research has shown that variables such as undergraduate major affect various
biases. See, e.g., Robert Frank, Dennis Regan & Tom Gilovich, Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation? 7
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 159, 160-12 (Spring 1993); Robert Frank, Dennis Regan & Tom Gilovich, Do
Economists Make Bad Citizens? 10 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 187 (Winter 1996).

41

Evidence suggests that subjects endow objects quite quickly -- after possessing them for a very short period of time
(e.g., five minutes). For women, the endowment effect appears to increase with duration of ownership. Strahilevitz
& Lowenstein, supra note 39.
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with it.42
Each subject received $5 simply to participate in the experiment. The “control group”
subjects were told that if they completed the experiment they would receive additional
remuneration, ranging from $1-$9 in cash, or, potentially, a mug, depending on the choices they
made during the experiment. The agency subjects were told they faced potential additional
remuneration of $2-$15 and/or, potentially, a mug, depending on the choices they made during the
experiment. Prior experimental literature indicates that these payoff levels are sufficient to induce
subjects to care about the choices they make.43

B. The Control Group
The 35 control group subjects participated in an experiment designed to replicate the basic
endowment effect experiments, in order to ensure that our subjects would indeed manifest an
endowment effect with respect to a USC coffee mug outside of the agency context. These control
subjects were divided into two, essentially equal, groups: “endowed” (18) and “unendowed” (17).44
The endowed subjects were given a mug at the beginning of the experiment; the unendowed were
not. Each group was presented with a piece of paper which asked them in a series of questions to
choose between the mug and a stipulated amount of money. Each endowed subject was asked
whether she would “sell” the mug at each specified amount. Each unendowed was asked whether
she would “choose” the mug or the money at each specified amount. The stipulated prices ranged
from $1 to $9, in $.50 increments.45

42

Each subject participated in only one version of the subject (we did not allow any subject to participate in the
endowed version and then later in the unendowed version). This is important because evidence suggests that past
ownership of an object -- for example, in a prior endowed experiment -- affects unendowed subjects’ behavior. See
Strahilevitz & Lowenstein, supra note 26.

43

See Colin F. Camerer and Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and
Capital-Labor-Production Framework, JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY (2000)(forthcoming).

44

The subjects were not told the name of the groups that they were placed in.

45

Specifically, the endowed subjects in the control group were given the following instructions:
You now have, and own, a mug which you can keep and take home. You also have the option of selling it and receiving
money for it. For each of the possible prices listed below, please indicate whether you wish to (1) Receive that amount
of money and sell your mug, or (2) Keep your mug and not sell it as this price.
These instructions will look as follows. For each price you will indicate your decision by marking an X in the appropriate
column.
I will keep the mug

I will sell

If the price is $1
If the price is $1.50
.
.
If the price is $9

The unendowed subjects received similar instructions, though these asked them to “choose” between a money and mug
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The subjects were told that at the end of the experiment a dollar amount would be selected
randomly, 46 and each subject’s choice at that amount would be effectuated. Thus, if at the end of
the experiment the amount $5.50 was selected randomly, then each subject would receive either
$5.50 or a mug depending on whether she had indicated a preference for the mug or $5.50 on the
choice sheet.
As in previous experiments, we tested for the endowment effect by comparing the price at
which our endowed subjects were willing to exchange the mug for money with the price at which
our unendowed subjects opted for money instead of the mug: in other words, we compared the
WTA of our endowed subjects with the WTP of our unendowed subjects.
Consistent with prior evidence, our control group manifested a pronounced endowment
effect. As shown in Figure 1, the mug contribution/rejection rate is consistently greater for
unendowed subjects than for endowed subjects at virtually every price. For example, in order to
induce 50% of the subjects to select money instead of the mug, it would be necessary to offer
endowed subjects approximately $5, whereas a payment of only just over $2 was sufficient to
induce 50% of the unendowed subjects to pass up the mug -- thus, the endowed subjects required
a premium of approximately $3 to induce a 50% contribution rate. Moreover, at the modest $2
price at which approximately half the unendowed subjects chose cash, more than 90% of the
endowed subjects opted to keep the mug over the money. Overall, the median WTA of endowed
subjects ($4.50) exceeded the median WTP of unendowed subjects ($2.50) by fully $2.00.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The clear graphical distinction between the subjects’ WTA and WTP is also reflected in
statistical tests. The mean WTA of the endowed subjects ($4.71) exceeded the mean WTP of the
unendowed subjects ($3.14) by a full $1.57 -- a figure that is also statistically significant (one-sided
t-test, p=0.0175, df=33). Likewise, a non-parametric two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test also
rejects the null hypothesis of distributional symmetry (z=2.328, p=0.0199). These differences are
comparable in both their strength and numerical magnitude to the existing literature, and are
consistent with the conclusion that USC Law School students appear to be comparable to other
subject groups.

C. Initial Agency Experiment
Having established that our subject population displays endowment effects in the standard
experimental context, we next examined whether these effects persist when subjects are placed in
which they did not yet own (as opposed to assessing sale prices). These instructions are based on Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler, supra note . We used this specification rather than the instructions from the original endowment effect
experiment because of the possibility of strategic behavior inherent in the original formulation.
46

Specifically, subjects were told that slips of paper representing each listed monetary amount would be put into a hat
and a subject would draw an amount from the hat.
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a corporate agency context. Our initial hypothesis was that corporate agency relationships would
mute the endowment effect for one of two principal reasons. First, agents of corporations might
not display such effects if transacting with the firm causes them to focus on their entitlements as
units of exchange, rather than objects with consumption value (the exchange value hypothesis).47
Second, agents’ sense of loyalty to their corporate employers might cause them to feel that the firm
is somehow also “entitled” to assets they own that might benefit the firm, thus muting the
endowment effect by causing endowed subjects not to feel fully entitled to their own assets (the
shared entitlement hypothesis). To test whether either or both of these effects in business agency
relationships dampened the endowment effect, we altered the experiment introduce an employment
relationship. We describe the specifics of this experiment below.
1. Detailed Description of the Experiment
The agency cost experiment involved 69 subjects: 29 “endowed” subjects who were given
a mug at the beginning of the experiment and 40 “unendowed” subjects. Unlike the control, in this
experiment subjects were informed that they were being offered a managerial job by a for-profit
corporation, Amalgamated Products, and that the mug was a potential factor of production for the
firm.48 In each round of the experiment, subjects received a contractual offer to work as a manager
for the firm. The contract was contingent on the firm’s performance, however, and would pay a
different amount of money depending on whether the firm earned a low profit or a high profit. The
amount offered if the firm earned a low profit was always $2, but the amount offered if the firm
earned a high profit (the “high wage”) varied from $3 to $15.
Subjects were told that whether the firm earned low or high profits depended, in turn, on
whether the firm used a mug as a factor of production. Each endowed subject was told that the
firm could only use a mug if the subject parted with her own. Each unendowed subject was told
she would be given control of the firm’s mug, and could either leave the mug with the firm or take
for it for herself. Each subject was told that if the firm did not use the mug, profits would be low,
and the subject would get a wage of only $2. By contrast, should the subject let the firm use the
mug, profits would be high and the subject would earn the higher wage, specified in the contract
during that round.
Thus in each round the subjects faced two choices. The first decision was whether to agree
to work for the firm.49 Any subject who refused the contract, would earn nothing for that round.
(The endowed subjects could keep the mug; the unendowed obviously could not). All subjects who
47

This might be particularly true to the extent that agents expect to use their assets as a factor of production.

48

To gain insight into the robustness of prior experimental results to the agency context we purposefully situated our
subjects in a very “thin” agency relationship -- a fictitious firm which made unilateral offers on pre-printed pages (with
no human representative. Evidence that such a weak relationship altered experimental results would suggest that these
results are not robust to the agency context, and would provide strong evidence that endowment effects would be altered
by the stronger agency relationships prevalent in the “real world.”

49

We selected a two-stage decision process because we were interested in whether the act of first committing to work
for a firm -- knowing the firm needed the mug as a factor of production -- might depress the endowed subjects’ sense
of entitlement, thereby reducing or eliminating the endowment effect.
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agreed to work for the firm then faced a second choice: whether to allow the firm to use the mug
as a factor of production in return for a higher salary or whether to obtain the mug for themselves.
For the endowed subjects, this effectively involved a decision of whether to sell the mug to the firm
for a specified higher wage; for the unendowed subjects, this involved a decision of whether to
claim the mug from the firm in return for a specified lower wage.
Each subject participated in eight rounds of the experiment. Subjects were told that their
actual compensation from the experiment would include their earnings from one of the eight
rounds, selected at random at the end of the experiment.50 We emphasized to the students that their
choices in one round would not affect their options in other rounds. To make this promise credible,
each subject was handed a package representing all the questions they would be asked in advance,
so that they would feel confident that the actions taken would not affect the other bids they would
be offered.51 Moreover, in order to avoid one subject’s choices influencing others’, the subjects
were seated apart from each other. The high wage offers in each packet were also presented in a
different order for each subject, so that in any given round no two subjects seated near each other
had the same offer. Upon the completion of the final round, we used an eight-sided die to choose
the round that would determine the subjects’ actual payoffs. The subjects then accepted payment
in cash, and, if they had chosen to contribute their mug to the firm in the selected round, the
subject also handed her mug back to the experimenter.
This design allows us to impute each subject’s approximate valuation of the mug at the end
of the eight rounds. First, note that for either group, a strategy of accepting the contract and
keeping the mug strictly dominates rejecting the contract. By rejecting the contract the subject gets
either the mug (if endowed) or nothing (if unendowed), but by accepting the contract and then
keeping the mug the subject can guarantee himself the mug plus $2. Thus, we predicted -correctly -- that virtually all subjects who understood the experiment would accept the contract in
every round.52 The principal choice of interest for those accepting the contract, then, is whether
to choose the package outcome of {low wage, mug} or the alternative allocation of {high wage,
no mug}. By varying the high wage offers by round, we were determine the critical wage wh that
would just induce subjects in each condition to choose the non-mug allocation, thereby allowing
the firm to use the mug in production. Subtracting the $2 baseline wage from this amount yielded
an estimate of the subject’s implicit valuation.
Evidence that the endowed subjects required a greater payoff to part with the mug than
50

Each subject also received $5 for simply participating in the experiment.

51

In addition, in order to ensure that students’ answers were not affected by future questions, we told students they
must all proceed at the same pace, could not turn a page unless told, and then carefully monitored whether they did so
(given the set up in the rooms, this was easily done). Moreover, we accurately informed students that although each
student was given the same set of contracts, the order in which the contracts were presented to the students varied across
students, to ensure that students would not adjust their answers based on those given by their neighbors. Also, the “high
wage” contracts were not done sequentially: a subject might well receive a $3 “high wage” offer, followed by a $15 one,
and then a $4 one.

52

Interestingly, there were a ver few subjects who rejected the contract in one or more rounds. Though these subjects
are excluded from the current paper (on the basis of assumed inconsistency), one might be able to tell a convincing story
for leaving them in. We shall address this surprising phenomenon in future work.
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unendowed subjects would require to abstain from claiming it would be consistent with subjects
displaying endowment effects in this context.53 A lack of significant difference between the
respective wage offers required to induce the two groups to part with (not take) the mug would
thereby constitute evidence that the agency context interacts importantly with the endowment
effect, former significantly dampening its magnitude.
2. The Results
In contrast with our control group, our agency subjects did not display a significant
endowment effect. Thus our data suggests a significant interaction between the agency context and
endowment effects, with the business agency context dampening or eliminating the impact of initial
ownership on implicit valuations. We detail these conclusions below.
To evaluate our results, it is perhaps most helpful to examine the analog to Figure 1 above,
and thus to examine the relative frequency with which the endowed and unendowed subjects
passed up possession of the mug, conditional on the high wage offer. This is shown in Figure 2:
The horizontal axis of Figure 2 depicts the difference between the wage offered to the subjects in
the “high payoff” and the “low payoff” states of the world, respectively. The vertical axis depicts
the empirical frequency with which subjects chose the allocation that left them without a mug.54
As before, the Figure also illustrates the trends in each cell through use of a 2-period moving
average
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Examination of Figure 2 suggests that situating subjects in the agency context had a
significant effect in muting the endowment effect. In contrast with the control experiment – in
which the endowed subjects valued the mug on average $1.57 more than the unendowed subjects
-- the difference in relative valuations evidenced by our endowed and unendowed agency subjects
are nowhere near that level, and indeed do not appear to be of particular economic significance. On
first blush, then, this figure provides preliminary evidence that our subjects did not manifest an
economically significant endowment effect -- and certainly nowhere near the effect found in
previous experiments (if at all). Indeed, the two samples display an identical median valuation of
$3.00.
Examination of the summary statistics are consistent with this conclusion. The slight
numerical difference between WTA and WTP in our agency condition subjects is not statistically
53

Such a finding would only have been consistent with such a result, because there would have been other possible
explanations – for example, that subjects felt guilty about “taking” the firm’s mug, which would result in unendowed
subjects placing a particularly low value on the mug. Since guilt would only exacerbate a valuation differences between
our endowed and unendowed subjects, we need not control for it given our result of no significant differences in the
behavior of the two groups.

54

Thus, for the endowed condition, the vertical axis depicts the frequency with which subjects “contributed” their
mug; for the unendowed condition, it depicts the frequency with which subjects “abstained from taking” the firm’s mug;
and for the Exchange value condition, it depicts the frequency with which subjects chose the no-mug/high-payoff
contract.

ARLEN, SPITZER & TALLEY

17

different from zero.55 Specifically, examining the subjects’ implied valuations, we found that the
endowed subjects had a mean WTA of $3.08, where as the unendowed subjects had a mean WTP
of $2.95. These means are not statistically significant at any conventional significance level (twotailed t-test p=0.806, df=67). Likewise, a non-parametric two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test fails
to reject the null hypothesis of distributional symmetry (z=0.025, p=0.9803).
Although these summary statistics are relatively powerful themselves, we employed
regression analysis to confirm that the dampening effect observed in our agency analysis was not
the result of some other observed demographic trait. Our primary question is whether the endowed
and unendowed subjects exhibit significant cross-group difference, controlling for wage (and
possibly other factors). In order to make full use of our data structure, we first estimated the
following basic relation:
Pr {NoMugij = 1} = Pr{ γ tXij + εij > 0},

(1)

where the left-hand side denotes the probability that a randomly-selected subject (subject i) in a
randomly-selected round (round j) will choose to part with the mug (NoMugij=1); and the righthand denotes the probability that a linear combination of independent variables for that
subject/round (Xij) representing subject characteristics (e.g., wage offers, subject treatment dummy
variables, and demographic characteristics) with a set of coefficients (γ); summed with an error
term (εij) exceeds zero, and in which εij has a specified distribution. The panel structure of our data
set necessitates that we control for individual subject effects through the rounds. Therefore, we
report the results from a random-effects logit approach56 in Table 1, with the endowed condition
as the baseline. For purposes of controlling for error variance, we also included other demographic
variables57 in specification [1] (though we obviously are not attempting to test a positive theory
about the relationship between demographic variables on manifest endowment effects).

55

On inspection of Figure 2, however, one can make some conclusions about whether our results are numerically (as
opposed to statistically) significant. Indeed, one stark aspect about the Figure is how close each of the depicted
schedules are to one another. This certainly does not suggest the many-fold WTA/WTP ratios found in previous
endowment effect experiments. See supra Section I A.

56

In performing these estimations, it is important to keep two factors in mind. First, the dependent variable of interest
(NoMugij) is qualitative in nature, and thus ordinary least squares regression is inappropriate. Second, our data set is
a panel data set, involving both cross-sectional and time-series dimensions (i.e., numerous subjects, each playing
multiple rounds). As such, error terms in the above estimation (εij) are likely to be highly correlated across subjects.
See, e.g., M.R. Conway, A Random Effects Model for Binary Data, 46 Biometrics 317 (1990). As a robustness check,
we have done the same set of estimations using fixed effect approaches and a linear probability (GLS) approach. Those
results are not reproduced here, but are qualitatively similar.

57

In particular, we included demographic characteristics such as a sex dummy, a dummy for whether the subject had
two or more siblings in his/her household growing up, the marital/domestic partner status of the subject, whether the
subject was non-white, and whether the subject was a social science major as an undergraduate. We included such
demographics as a robustness check, given the existence of some research indicating that certain demographic traits
(such as sex) are predictive of manifest biases. See sources cited in note 39, supra.
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Table 1: Random Effects Logit on Agency-Condition Subjects
Baseline Case: Endowed condition

wH
Unendowed
ManySibs (>=2)
Female
Married/Cohab
Non-White
SocSci

[1]
1.058897
0.1286107**
0.3510971
0.7365878
-1.888621
0.7710764**
0.5573271
0.7432729
1.392177
0.8834465*
0.4721307
0.8822647
-1.757632
0.8089902**

Log Likelihood
-163.31138
Constant Term Not Reported
Standard Error in Italics

[2]
1.033449
0.122762**
0.3579227
0.8592371

[3]
1.034438
0.1230016**

-170.56895

-170.65723

(*= Significant at 90% level; **= Significant at 95% level)

Most importantly, note from specification [2] in Table 1 that membership in the unendowed
condition has no numerically or statistically significant effect on the likelihood of parting with the
mug. This statistical insignificance appears holds for any number of alternative specifications of
the estimated model, and does not seem to turn on the addition of other demographic regressors
(reported in specification [1]), or various interaction terms (not reported).
The observation that the agency context causes imputed values to converge, while
important in its own right, begs the question of the precise manner in which this interaction effect
takes hold. In particular, it leaves open questions of whether introducing the agency context (1)
dampens the initial ownership valuation of an endowed subject; (2) strengthens the initial valuation
of an unendowed subject; or (3) has both effects simultaneously. It is to this question we now turn.
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Table 2: OLS Regression (Agency & Control Subjects)
(Standard errors below coefficients in italics)
Dependent Variable: Subject's Implied Valuation
Baseline: Unendowed Control Group; **=.05 sig. level
[1]
[2]
Endowed Control
1.653881
1.561275
0.7432859** 0.7593732**
Endowed Agent
0.2292936
-0.198783
0.6858855
0.685863
Unendowed Agent
0.5380047
-0.0595588
0.6709513
0.6500772
End. or Unend. Agent
Age
Female
Non-White
Social Science Major
Constant

F
Adjusted R-squared

[3]
1.652405
0.7406837**

-0.0529787
0.0412152
-0.9531691
0.439881**
-0.4849271
0.465969
0.5549345
0.4796419
4.448292
1.262905

3.147059
0.5445747**

0.394256
0.61931
-0.0542684
0.0410088
-0.9296653
0.4364033**
-0.4476269
0.4597143
0.5344027
0.4766088
3.147059
0.5445747**

2.58**
0.0972

2.73**
0.0758

2.98**
0.1035

Table 2 reports the results of a series of ordinary least squares regressions in which the
dependent variable is the subject’s valuation of the mug. As noted above, for the subjects in the
control conditions, this value was elicited directly; for the subjects in the agency conditions, we
computed this valuation (as noted above) by taking the difference between the high and low wages
offered at the lowest wage at which the subject opted for the money rather than the mug. Perhaps
the most telling specification is [2], which regresses subjects’ imputed valuations on three dummy
variables corresponding to our differing treatments, with the unendowed control group serving as
a baseline. Note from the table that membership in either the endowed or unendowed agent group
does not have a significant effect on predicted valuation. In other words, subjects in these groups
appear to be behaving similarly to those in the baseline group of unendowed control subjects.
Indeed, testing the hypothesis that these coefficients are jointly zero suggests confirmation of this
conjecture (F(2,100)=0.05; p=0.95). Indeed, the only subgroup that appears to act in a
significantly different fashion is the control group subjects who were endowed with a mug: it is
these subjects who valued the mug more, thus generating a significant endowment effect. By
contrast, putting an endowed individual into an agency relationship apparently induces her to
behave as if she was never endowed to begin with. This pattern is consistent in the other two
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specifications ([1] and [3]), which add additional demographic variables and combines the agency
subjects into a single categorical dummy.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Another way to see this effect is to overlay Figures 1 and 2, as represented in Figure 3 (in
dollar increments58). What is immediately striking about the Figure is the extent to which the
choosers group overlaps with both agency conditions, with the seller group alone manifesting a
significantly smaller willingness to part with the mug at every price level behind (indicating a
greater implicit valuation of the mug). Once again, the Figure is highly suggestive of a dampening
effect for endowed subjects when placed within an agency context.
3. Quality of the Results
Although the interaction effect between agency contexts and endowment effects identified
above appears to be strong, we nonetheless considered whether certain limitations of our
experimental design hampered the reliability of our statistical analysis. Below, we discuss four of
the most pertinent limitations.
a. Experiment Complexity and Insignificant Stakes
We first considered the possibility that the experiment was too complex for subjects to
understand and/or that monetary stakes involved in the experiment were too low to induce the
subjects to attend seriously to the decision before them. We rejected these alternative explanations
for several reasons.
First, previous experimental literature suggests that our payoff levels are sufficient to
induce subjects to care about the choices they make.59 Second, payoff levels in the agency
condition were within the range of the payoffs employed in the control experiment in which
subjects did display an endowment effect. Third, the subjects’ behavior suggests that the stakes
were sufficient to generate meaningful results. Both endowed and unendowed subjects were
responsive to financial incentives: as “price” for the mug (i.e., the wage difference, wh-wl)
increases, subjects increasingly selected the all-cash allocation instead of keeping the mug.
Indeed, at the low end of the scale (wh=$3) no group of subjects passed up the mug at a rate of more
than 35%, whereas at the high rate of the scale (wh=$11), subjects in all groups parted with the mug
at a greater than 95% rate. Moreover, Figure 2 reveals that the frequency with which subjects part
with the mug is monotonically increasing in the high wage, wh.60 This is a strong indication that
58

Because the agency group subjects had their valuations elicited in dollar increments only, Figure 3 superimposes
only the integer dollar observations of the control group (from Figure 1) atop the agency group (from Figure 2).
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See Camerer & Hogarth, supra note 55.

The one weak exception occurs with unendowed subjects, who part with the mug at a constant 75% rate for both
wh=$6 and wh=$7.
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the monetary amounts at stake are both sufficiently large and variable to obtain meaningful results.
Indeed, if the monetary stakes were so small as to be considered trivial by subjects, we would
expect to observe seemingly random behavior in all conditions. Finally, consistent with wellbehaved results we note that the unendowed subjects are everywhere more willing to give up the
mug than the endowed subjects (in other words, the two lines do not cross) -- although the
difference is neither economically nor statistically significant.
The evidence that the frequency with which subjects parted with the mug is monotonically
increasing in the high wage offers -- as theory would predict -- also suggests that subjects were not
confused by the experiment. Confused subjects would be expected to behave more erratically.61
b. Differences in the Subject Populations
We also considered the possibility that differences in the subject pools in the two groups
– endowed and unendowed – might be driving our results. We believe this is unlikely. The
subjects were randomly distributed between the two groups, and we therefore have no systematic
reason to expect that the two subject pools are different.
We nevertheless did consider the possibility that demographic differences in the population
might be masking the endowment effect. In particular, there is evidence to suggest that women
may value objects differently than men.62 Thus we considered whether this possibility might be
affecting our findings as well. Gender differences in the subject populations could mask an
endowment effect if, for example, women valued the mug less than men, and if the endowed
subjects were disproportionately female while the endowed subjects were either evenly distributed
or disproportionately male.
Our data confirm the importance of considering the role of gender differences, revealing
that women and men subjects did tend to value the mugs differently. For instance, in Table 1,
women were more likely, all else held constant, to part with the mug at every wage level.
Similarly, in Table 2, the implicit value placed on the mug by women subjects was approximately
90 cents lower than that of men.
Nevertheless, we did not find any evidence that these gender differences account for our
interaction result, that the agency context mutes the endowment effect. Gender differences would
plausibly mute evidence of an endowment effect only if a disproportionate number of the endowed
subjects were women in the agency experiment. In our agency experiment, 57% of the total group
were women, while the endowed subgroup consisted of 52% women (very close to our
representative total). Moreover, in both specifications [1] and [3] above (and in Table 1), our
principal results attempt to control for gender and our interaction result is robust to that finding.
Finally, if gender biases were muting significant endowment effects in the agent condition, we
61

Our conclusion that they understood the experiment is supported by our interactions with the subjects, which
indicated they were not confused. After reading the consent form, we gave the subjects an opportunity to ask questions.
Subjects then played two practice rounds, to help ensure that they understood the experiment. Following the practice
rounds, the subjects answered a detailed questionnaire designed to ensure that they understood the experiment. Finally,
the choice the subjects had to make was quite straightforward: have a mug or get more money.
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See Strahilevitz & Lowenstein, supra note 52.
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would expect to find evidence of an endowment effect in a single-gender subgroup. Testing for
endowment effects in the male-only and female-only sub-populations of the agent condition reveals
no significant evidence of an endowment effect.63
c. Condition Mismatch
We also considered the possibility that our results from the control and agency conditions
are simply not comparable. While the predominant distinction between these two groups is one
of framing and context (i.e., the exact effect we wish to test), it is important to acknowledge that
the two sets of data were gathered using slightly different protocols. In particular, the control group
valuations were elicited simultaneously in a single round, while the agency group valuations were
collected ad seriatim in randomized rounds of bargaining. Moreover, the minimal increments for
valuation tested were smaller (at $0.50) for the control group than they were for the agency group
(at $1.00). Finally, subjects in the agency group were always guaranteed a payment of $2 more than
those in the control group would receive, possibly giving rise to income effects. Given our data
structure, then, one might conceivably argue that any cross-condition differences we find are an
artifact of some of these other asymmetries.
We believe, however, that such concerns are assuaged by a few important considerations.
First, our agency condition generates implicit valuations that square almost precisely with those
in the unendowed control group. Indeed, as noted above, there is no statistical difference between
the responses in these three constituent groups. As such, we feel relatively confident that even
despite the slight differences in experimental protocol, the two groups are statistically comparable.
Second, to our knowledge, the existing literature provides little indication that sequential elicitation
of valuations works to eliminate the endowment effect entirely. While some studies have found that
learning reduces the phenomenon over time,64 the subjects within our agency conditions exhibit
virtually no endowment effect at all on average.
Nevertheless, it is possible to gain at least some purchase on whether such learning
considerations carry significant weight by concentrating our analysis on the initial rounds of the
agency experiment. If a learning effect is substantially at play, we would expect a larger difference
between the behavior of endowed and unendowed subjects early on in that experiment (both
numerically and statistically), with convergence occurring only later.65 To explore this possibility,
we reran the logit analysis reported in Table 1 (explicitly, specification [2]), but on a truncated data
set consisting of only the first round, first two rounds, and first three rounds (respectively) of the
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Similarly, we did not find an endowment effect when we separated the sample based on race, domestic/marital
status, or number of siblings.

64

See, e.g., Shogren et al, supra note 17 (finding that the divergence of WTP and WTA value measures is persistent,
even with repeated market participation and full information). Accord Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and
Evidence of Non

65

Note that because the first round of the agency experiment only nominated a single wage, we cannot directly
compare the first round of the agency experiments with the control (where a series of prices was nominated).
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agency experiment.66 Table 3 reports on these analyses.
Table 3: Random Effects Logit on Early Rounds of Agency-Condition
Baseline Case: Endowed condition
[1]
Rnd. 1 only
0.492
0.161**
Unendowed
0.799
0.626
Constant Term Not Reported
Standard Error in Italics
wH

[2]

[3]

Rnds. 1, 2
0.759
0.190**
0.575
0.639

Rnds. 1, 2, 3
0.870
0.180**
0.274
0.711

(*= Significant at 90% level; **= Significant at 95% level)

Recall from Table 1 that the coefficient on the “Unendowed” dummy in the 8-round case was equal
to 0.3510971 with an insignificant standard error of 0.7366. The results of Table 3 are largely
consistent with these earlier results. Indeed, even when the analysis is limited to Round 1 alone,
unendowed subjects are not significantly more likely to pass up the mug for the money at any
conventional significance level (p-value = 0.21). Limiting the analysis to the first two and the first
three rounds, respectively, yielded results that were progressively similar to the full experiment.
At the same time, even as the first-round analysis continues to give insignificant results, the results
do appear to be slightly stronger than those of the full, eight-round analysis. This is, of course,
consistent with the argument noted above that endowment effects can weaken through learning.
However, Table 3 suggests that at least within our agency condition, they appear to be starting from
a relatively weak, not statistically significant, condition to begin with.67
d. Framing Effects
Finally, we considered a possible objection to the agency conditions in our study on the
grounds that they introduce a type of framing effect: subjects in the endowed agency condition
were told that they had to choose between contributing their own mug and refusing to do so, while
those in the unendowed agency condition were told that they must choose between to taking the
firm’s mug and abstaining. This added contextual detail, one might argue, may have inadvertently
introduced a moral distinction between the actions of the subjects in the two conditions. Subjects
who possessed other-regarding preferences toward the firm might feel greater anxiety over the
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We did the same for truncated versions of the data set consisting of the first two, the first three, and the first four
rounds.

67

Of course, without gathering more data it would be impossible to state with certainty whether the slight difference
in protocols has a dispositive effect. There are other slight differences (such as the knowledge that only one of the eight
rounds would count for final payoffs) that we cannot directly test.
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prospect of taking the firm’s mug than failing to contribute their own to the enterprise.
While we recognize this potential criticism, we remain relatively confident of our results
for a number of reasons. Most immediately, the framing effect concern tends to support our results
instead of undercutting them. Indeed, the principal consequence of the framing effect described
above would be to place the patina of moral blameworthiness on subjects who “took” the firm’s
mug, making them more reluctant to do so than subjects who already felt a sense of rightful
ownership. This would be expected to increase the differential between the endowed and
unendowed subjects’ valuations. Thus, had we detected an endowment effect among our agency
subjects, this critique would might render our results somewhat ambiguous, for we would not be
able to identify whether the detected “wedge” separating the subjects was an artifact of endowment
effects, framing effects, or some combination thereof. Given that we were unable to find such a
wedge in the first place, however, the framing effect critique seems inapposite.68
Nevertheless, as a failsafe, we ran one additional experimental treatment (not reported upon
in detail here) in which unendowed subjects were simply given the choice between accepting a
contract that contained a low wage with a mug (and in which the firm would receive a low payoff)
verses a contract that contained a high wage with no mug (in which the firm would receive a high
payoff). Such an experimental design helps to remove the possible moral blameworthiness of
taking the firm’s mug. Comparing these unendowed agency “choosers” with our endowed agency
subjects, we did not find evidence of a significant difference in valuations.

IV. UNDERSTANDING THE RESULTS WITH AN ADDITIONAL TEST
The data from our agency conditions suggests that the business agency context has a
significant effect on subjects’ valuations, arguably bringing private valuation behavior in line with
the predictions of rational choice theory. The obvious question is, why? This section posits two
possible distinctions and attempts to test between them using an additional experimental condition.
The “Exchange Value” hypothesis: The first possible explanation for our results, and the
simplest, is that the agency context makes salient the exchange value of the mug rather than its
consumption value, thereby causing subjects to treat it as a fungible good. This conjecture is
consistent with evidence that individuals do not endow goods that they view predominantly as
trading goods or stores of value.69 It also is consistent with evidence that agents who repeatedly
trade goods with uniqueness attributes (like sports memorabilia) do not display significant
endowment effects.70 Confirmation of this hypothesis would comprise additional evidence that the
68

In addition, we deliberately designed the experimental materials to involve a rather “thin” and unembellished
description of the firm. “Amalgamated Products” had no individual associated with it, and the consequences (if any)
of a low payoff for the firm were never made salient to the experimental subjects. Given that our primary enterprise was
to test for endowment effects (and not other-regarding preferences) within organizational environment, such an
approach is entirely appropriate.
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See supra text accompanying note 43 and notes 33, 35 - 35.

70

See List, supra note 43.
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endowment effect does not depend simply on objective factors – such as the presence of thick
markets – but also on psychological factors affecting whether the subject focuses on the exchange
value or the consumption value of the good.
The “Shared Entitlement” hypothesis: A second possible explanation is that the
organizational context blurs the distinction between the agent’s own endowment and that of the
firm (effectively substituting “our” in place of “my”). Viewed from this perspective, subjects who
agreed to work for the firm knowing that the firm’s profits depended on its ability to use the asset
might come to view the firm as jointly entitled to the asset. Their ensuing sense of obligation to
the firm might cause them to be less protective of their entitlement than they would be otherwise.
Moreover, this sense of asset commingling could also make unendowed agents feel more entitled
to claim a share of the firm’s assets, and thereby more likely to value the mug highly. Combined,
these joint or “shared entitlement” effects would cause a convergence of WTP and WTA in the
organizational context, and could conceivably yield our agency results.
In order to assess which of these two hypotheses is most consistent with our results, we
formulated an additional experiment designed to distinguish between them. In particular, in this
experiment, we tested for the existence of endowment effects within an agency context which
implicated the “exchange value” hypothesis, but in which the preconditions for the “shared
entitlement” hypothesis were removed. We again did not find any evidence of a significant
endowment effect, both confirming the results of our prior agency experiment and providing
evidence consistent with the exchange value hypothesis.71

A. Detailed Description of the “Exchange Value” Experiment
The exchange value experiment was fundamentally similar to the basic agency endowment
experiment in its basic procedures. As before, we divided the subjects into two groups: endowed
and unendowed. As before, the subjects were told that they were being recruited to be a manager
for Amalgamated Products,72 and were offered a choice between receiving a low wage coupled with
a mug and receiving a higher wage and no mug. In this experiment, however, the subjects made
this decision at the same time they decided whether to work for the firm. Moreover, in this
experiment the subjects were not told that their choice would affect the firm’s profits: the subjects
simply could increase their monetary wage if they chose, respectively, not to accept or to retain the
mug.
Specifically, both endowed and unendowed exchange value subjects were told that, in each
round, Amalgamated Products would make them an offer to come work for it consisting of a choice
71

By implication, then, our results also suggest that our findings in Section II are not driven by the fact that the mug
was a potential factor of production.
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Although they were informed that their job at the firm would be one of a “manager,” these subjects were told
nothing about any duties that such a job might entail (See Appendix, infra). This was done in order to minimize any
potential effects of the shared entitlement hypothesis. (It is, of course, possible that the very use of the term manager
might itself trigger a sense of shared entitlement, though we conjecture that such an effect would require greater
contextual richness than the use of a single word).
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of one of two employment contracts. The unendowed subjects were told that: “the two contracts
will differ in the monetary amount offered and in whether or not the firm agrees to pay you a mug,
in addition to a monetary wage.” The endowed subjects were told that the “two contracts will
differ in the monetary amount offered, depending on whether or not you agree to contribute your
mug to the firm when you go to work for it.” Each subject in each groups was then told that she
would receive a $2 wage if she took/kept the mug, and a higher wage (ranging from $3 to $15
depending on the round) if she did not keep/take the mug. Each subject thus had three choices:
reject both contracts and refuse to work for the firm for that round (in which case she would not
get any monetary payoff), or agree to work for the firm and accept one of the two contracts. As
before, each subject was told that one of the rounds would be selected at random at the end of the
experiment and that she would receive the payoff they selected in that round.
The experimental instructions for this condition did not mention any impact of the mug on
the firm’s profits. Nor were subjects told that the mug could be used as a factor of production.
Thus, the primary difference between this experiment and the control experiment is that subjects
were placed in a business context where the amount they were being offered for the mug took the
form of wages for their services.

B. The Results
There were 76 subjects participating in this experiment:73 33 endowed with a mug and 43
unendowed. Figure 4 presents an analysis of the relative frequency with which the endowed and
unendowed subjects passed up possession of the mug, conditional on the high wage offer. As in
previous experiments, both the endowed and unendowed subjects’ willingness not to end up with
possession of the mug is monotonically increasing in the high wage offer. This is consistent with
the payoffs being sufficiently large to motivate subjects to make meaningful choices; it also is
consistent with subjects understanding the experiment.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Visual examination of Figure 4 reveals evidence of a small WTP/WTA differential, but not
one that is particularly economically significant. Endowed exchange value subjects are slightly
less likely to choose the mug over cash at each implied valuation level, but the effect appears
minimal at any valuation level. And indeed, the mean valuation of endowed subjects ($3.81)
exceeded that of the unendowed subjects ($3.38) by $0.43, approximately 27 percent of the
observed difference in the control group of $1.57. Moreover, as with the agency condition, the two
samples display an identical median valuation of $3.00.
Statistically comparing the mean valuations indicates that this modest numerical difference
is not only economically modest but also is statistically insignificant (one-sided t-test, p=0.252,
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These subjects also were first year law students who participated either in the summer before starting law school
or in the first few weeks of the first semester. The payoffs and procedures were the same as the agency experiment.

ARLEN, SPITZER & TALLEY

27

df=65). Likewise, a non-parametric two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test fails to reject the null
hypothesis of distributional symmetry (z=0.68, p=0.49), though less emphatically than in the
agency condition.
C. Discussion
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that situating subjects in an agency context
mutes the endowment effect because the subjects focus on the exchange value of the entitlements
for trade.
Our conclusion that our agency experiment results were primarily a product of exchange
value effects, not “shared entitlement” explanations, is supported by some of the literature on otherregarding preferences, which suggests that subjects would have been unlikely to manifest
significant other-regarding preferences in the context of our experiment. The possibility that agents
might manifest other-regarding behavior towards their principals motivated the “shared
entitlement” hypothesis. Yet, the evidence suggesting that people exhibit other-regarding behavior
also suggests they would not be particularly likely to do so in the context of our experiment. For
example, although there is evidence involving “Dictator” games74 showing that Dictators do share
a portion of the available surplus,75 when Dictators are told that the two players are in a “buyer”
and “seller” relationship they are significantly more selfish.76 In addition, the evidence suggests
that subjects are particularly disposed to be other-regarding with regard to a known recipient with
whom they have had contact, and are much less disposed to be other-regarding with regard to an
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A Dictator game is one in which one subject is given a specific amount of money (such as $1), and told she can
share as much (or as little) of it as she likes with the other player.
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See, e.g., Robert Forsythe, Joel L. Horowitz, N. E. Savin, and Martin Sefton, Fairness in Simple Bargaining
Experiments, 6 GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 347 (1994). This is in apparent contrast with the presumptions of
many law and economics scholars. Although nothing in economic theory pre-ordains it, conventional law and
economics generally defines “self interest” rather myopically, giving rather scant attention to other regarding
preferences (or “ORPs”) such as guilt, altruism, or other independent motivations for inter-personal fairness. Some
theorists have suggested that the evidence of other-regarding behavior is simply an artifact of experimental observation
-- of people’s desire to appear “fair” to the experimenters in a low stakes situation – and people do not exhibit otherregarding behavior in the real world. The existing evidence, however, does not support this hypothesis: although
experimenter observation does affect other-regarding behavior, subjects manifest ORPs even in a“double blind” Dictator
games in which neither the other experimental subject, nor the experimenter, would know of the Dictator’s decision.
See, e.g., Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, supra note 38; see also Gary Bolton & Rami Zwick, Anonymity vs
Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining, 10 GAMES & ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 95 (1995).
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Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, supra note ?, at Table II, page 357. Similarly, players in an Ultimatum
Games -- in which the first player is given money and told she can share as much as she likes with the other, but where
the other can reject the offer, in which case neither player gets anything – display significant evidence of other-regarding
behavior in many circumstances, but when subjects are told at the outset to maximize their winning, the first players
generally make minimal offers to share with the other player. K. Binmore et. al, Testing Noncooperative Bargaining
Theory: A Preliminary Study, 75 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1178 (1985). For a discussion of this experiment see
THALER, WINNER’S CURSE, supra note 5, at 26-27.
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unknown person.77 Thus, a fictitious profit-maximizing company -- Amalgamated Products -- with
no human representative would appear a particularly unlikely subject of other-regarding sentiment,
given the existing evidence.78
Nevertheless, although our results suggest that the exchange value condition is sufficient
to mute endowment effects – even absent other-regarding “shared entitlement” concerns – our
results do suggest some role for such other-regarding, albeit only a weak one. Specifically,
comparing the mug valuations of the exchange value subjects with those of the agency subjects
reveals that the exchange value subjects valued the mug on average more than the agency subjects.
Specifically, the mean valuation of the exchange value subjects was $3.57, which is $0.54 larger
than the mean valuation of the agency subjects of $3.03. This suggests that subjects concerns for
the firm may cause both endowed and unendowed subjects to value the mug less – while not
necessarily affecting the differential value between them. Nevertheless, in the context of our
experiment, this effect is relatively weak: the $0.54 difference is not only modest numerically but
statistically different from zero only at relatively weak significance levels (one-sided t-test,
p=0.098, df=142; two-tailed t-test, p=0.193, df=142). This basic finding emerges from more
complicated regression analyses as well (which we therefore omit in the current analysis). Given
the purely fictitious nature of our firm, our finding of some evidence consistent with otherregarding behavior even in this context suggests that further exploration of other-regarding
preferences in the business context may be warranted.79
77

For example, Bohnet and Frey ran a set of experiments involving three versions of the Dictator game: (1) the
Dictator and recipient did not know each other’s identity; (2) the Dictator and recipient look at each other (so they can
identify each other) but do not speak; (3) the Dictator and recipient may speak with each other, face-to-face, but may
not make a binding contract. They found that while the Dictator allocated, on average, one quarter of the initial
endowment to the recipient in the first version of the game, the second and third treatments produced virtually even
splits, and were statistically indistinguishable from one another. Iris Bohnet and Bruno S. Frey, The Sound of Silence
in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Games, 38 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION 43 (1999); Iris
Bohnet and Bruno S. Frey, Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment, 89
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 335 (1999). Bohnet and Frey seem to find more sharing in the anonymous condition
than do Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, supra note 38. However, the experimental protocols are not given with
enough specificity to allow the reader to conclude whether or not the results are inconsistent.
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This is not to say that people do not manifest other-regarding preferences towards institutions. For example, Eckel
and Grossman compared willingness to donate to ordinary recipients versus the American Red Cross and found that
Dictators allocated on average only10% of their payoffs to the ordinary subject recipients, but allocated 31% of their
payoffs to the American Red Cross. Catherine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman, Altruism in Anonymous Dictator
Games, 16 GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 181, 187 (1996). Nevertheless, this evidence is consistent with subjects’
preferring known and worthy recipients to those they are not familiar with. Amalgamated Products was neither a
charitable organization nor one that was known to the subjects (since it is a fictitious company).
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For example, there is evidence of other-regarding preferences in the agency context when the principal is an
individual rather than a company. See, e.g., Vital Anderhub, Simon Gächter, and Manfred Königstein, Efficient
Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment, INSTITUTE FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN
ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH, WORKING PAPER NO 18 (August 1999); W. Guth, Manfred Königstein,J. Kávacs,
and E. Zala, Fairness within Firms: The Case of One Principal and Multiple Agents, Working Paper, Humboldt
University Berlin (1999); W. Guth, W. Klose, Manfred Königstein, and J. Schwalbach, An Experimental Study of a
Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationship, 19 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS 327 (1998); see also E. Fehr,
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CONCLUSION
Behavioral law and economics has considerable potential implications for the study of
corporate law. Yet scholars’ efforts to analyze corporate law from this perspective have been
hampered by considerable uncertainty about whether phenomena identified in the laboratory persist
in the corporate context. This article has attempted to take a first step towards a more systematic
application of behavioral law and economics to company law by inquiring into the robustness of
a well-known cognitive bias – the endowment effect -- within an agency relationship. We find that
in the introducing a business agency relationship tends to dampen (and virtually eliminate) this
effect.
There are several possible implications of our results, both for the study of business
organizations and for behavioral law and economics generally. Specifically, our results suggest
that the business agency context may operate (at least in part) as a debiasing mechanism, thereby
representing an underappreciated consequence of organizing trade within the firm.80 Of course, just
as the business environment mutes some behavioral biases (such as the endowment effect), it could
certainly exacerbate others. Indeed, this is an area where increased attention to cognitive biases
by corporate scholars clearly seems to be warranted.81
In addition, our results highlight a broader message concerning the relationship between
normative policy analysis and experimental research. Reform proposals, by their very nature, tend
to be sweeping and general, implicating large populations in highly heterogeneous environments.
By contrast, experimental research is necessarily constrained within a specific, controlled
environment, purposely isolated from other aspects of the real world. This isolation is both its
great strength and its profound weakness. Observing a predictable behavioral pattern within a
controlled experimental setting enables researchers to make causal claims with minimal fear that
unobserved phenomena or reverse causality are driving the results. Yet this very controlled setting
makes it difficult to generalize to real-world settings that are the focus of policy reform proposals.
To be sure, we as a society must sometimes make difficult policy choices even in a world of
Simon Gächter, and G. Kirchsteiger, Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device – Experimental Evidence, 65
ECONOMETRICA 833 (1997); C. Keser and W. Willinger, Principal-agent Relations with Hidden Actions: An
Experimental Investigations, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1997). Of course, care also
must be taken before developing policy conclusions for corporate law based on other-regarding preferences because
these also are highly context dependent. See generally, Arlen, supra note 11, at 1785-1787.
80

See, e.g., Roberta Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and Their Implications for
Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 313 (1986).
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See Langevoort, supra note 4. Indeed, given the context-dependency of endowment effects, we cannot say that we
have shown that subjects would invariably fail to manifest endowment effects in the aggregate. Under different
conditions (for example, a different asset), subjects might manifest endowment effects. The central message of our
results is that scholars cannot simply assume that behavioral results found in outside the agency context are present
within the agency context.
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imperfect empirical knowledge. Nonetheless, that informational constraint should also not lead
us to ascribe undue explanatory power to any methodological paradigm, be it economics,
psychology, behavioral law and economics, or something else.
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APPENDIX
Subject Instructions
1. Agency Experiment: Endowed Subjects
If you proceed with the experiment, you will be given a USC mug, which can be purchased at the
campus bookstore.
The central purpose of the experiment is to examine decision making by managers of corporations.
You are to assume that you are being recruited by a large consumer marketing firm, Amalgamated Products
Corporation, which is seeking a manager for a new marketing project. Amalgamated will offer to pay you
for your managerial services. Should you accept its offer, the project you are to manage will produce a
monetary payoff for the firm, which could consist of either a low payoff or a high payoff, an outcome that
depends on actions you take as manager. Specifically, the success of the project depends on whether you
contribute your mug to the project: if you contribute your mug the project will produce a high payoff for
the firm, if you do not it will produce a low payoff for the firm.
In each round of the experiment a representative from Amalgamated Products will offer you a
contract to work for the firm in exchange for money. The amount the representative of the firm offers to
pay you may depend on whether the project yields a low payoff or a high payoff. Alternatively, the
representative may offer to pay you a fixed amount of money regardless of whether the project eventually
yields a low payoff or a high payoff. You may accept or reject the firm's offer as you see fit. All offers
are made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and are good only for the round in which they are made. There is
no bargaining. Thus, if you reject the representative's offer the round will end immediately, and your
personal payoff for that round will consist solely of your mug. You will indicate your acceptance or
rejection on the sheet of paper which states the offer.
Should you accept the firm's offer, you will become the manager of the project. You will then be
asked to make a choice between contributing your mug to the project or keeping it for yourself. This
decision is strictly yours. Indeed, regardless of your choice, the firm must pay you whatever wage it
offered you. However, as previously stated, your decision about whether to contribute your mug
determines whether the project yields a high payoff or a low payoff.
You will indicate your choice of whether to contribute your mug on a sheet of paper which you
will return to the experimenter. Your personal payoff for the round can then be determined. Your
personal payoff for the round will consist of whatever the firm owes you (depending on whether it was a
high payoff or low payoff project), plus your mug (if you had decided to keep it instead of contributing).
You will play eight rounds of this experiment (in addition to two practice rounds), for a total of
approximately one hour. The terms of the contract you are offered will vary from round to round, and do
not depend on anything that happened in any previous round. Your additional compensation (if any) for
participating in the experiment will be based on the outcome of one out of the eight rounds of the
experiment. In particular, at the end of the experiment the experimenter will use a random process to
determine which of the eight rounds counts for everyone. You will then be paid whatever you earned in
that round. For example, if the random process were to select round 1, and if in round one you had rejected
the firm’s contract, your payoff would consist solely of $5 plus a mug. Alternatively, if the random process
were to select round 4, and if in round 4 you had agreed to a contract paying you a flat wage of $2, and if
you decided to keep your mug, your total compensation would be $7 (=$5+$2) plus the mug. Or, if the
random process were to select round 2, and if in round 2 you had agreed to a contract paying you a wage
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of $2 for a low payoff and $8 for a high payoff, and if you decided to contribute your mug, your total
compensation would be $13 (=$5+$8) and no mug. You will begin each round with your original mug,
even if you had chosen to contribute it in the previous round.
2. Agency Experiment: Unendowed Subjects
The central purpose of the experiment is to examine decision making by managers of corporations.
You are to assume that you are being recruited by a large consumer marketing firm, Amalgamated Products
Corporation, which is seeking a manager for a new marketing project. Amalgamated will offer to pay you
for your managerial services. Should you accept its offer, the project you are to manage will produce a
monetary payoff for the firm, which could consist of either a low payoff or a high payoff, an outcome that
depends on the actions you take as manager.
Specifically, the success of the project depends on whether a mug the firm owns is used in the
project: the project will yield a high payoff for the firm if the mug is used, and a low payoff if the mug is
not used for the project.
In each round of the experiment a representative from Amalgamated Products will offer you a
contract to work for the firm during that round in exchange for money. The representative may offer to
pay you one amount if the project generates a low payoff for the firm and a different amount if the project
generates a high payoff. Alternatively, the representative may offer you a fixed amount of money
regardless of whether the project eventually yields a low payoff or a high payoff for the firm. You may
accept or reject the representative's offer as you see fit. All offers are made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
and are good only for the round in which they are made. There is no bargaining. If you reject the
representative's offer, the round will end immediately for you, and your payoff for that round will consist
of nothing. (Be aware, however, that a rejected offer still "counts" as one of the rounds you played.) You
will indicate your acceptance or rejection of the proposal on the sheet of paper which states the offer.
Should you accept the representative's offer, you will become the manager of the project. As
manager you will have exclusive access to some of the firm's property (and in particular, the mug). This
access affords you the opportunity to take the firm's mug for yourself, rather than leaving it to be used as
an input for the project. Indeed, regardless of your choice, the firm must pay you whatever wage it offered
you. However, your decision about whether to take the firm's mug determines whether the project yields
a high payoff or a low payoff.
You will indicate your decision as to whether to take the mug on a sheet of paper and return it to
the experimenter. This will determine whether the project yields a low payoff or a high payoff, and thus
what the firm owes you. Your personal payoff for the round, therefore, will consist of whatever the firm
owes you, plus the mug (if you had decided to take it).
You will play eight rounds of this experiment (in addition to two practice rounds), for a total of
approximately one hour. [Similar instructions to those above follow]
3. “Exchange value” Experiment: Unendowed Subjects
The central purpose of the experiment is to examine decision making by managers of corporations.
You are to assume that you are being recruited by a large consumer marketing firm, Amalgamated Products
Corporation, which is seeking a manager for a new marketing project. Amalgamated will offer to pay you
for your managerial services. In each round of the experiment, a representative from Amalgamated
Products will give you a proposal to work for the firm during that round. The proposal will give you a
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choice of one of two employment contracts. The two contracts will differ in the monetary amount offered
and in whether or not the firm agrees to pay you a mug, in addition to a monetary wage.
All offers are made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. There is no bargaining. You have three choices.
You may reject both contracts and refuse to work for the firm for that round. If you do this the round will
end immediately for you, and your payoff for that round will consist of nothing. (Be aware, however, that
a rejected offer still “counts” as one of the rounds you played). Alternatively, you may agree to work for
the firm and accept one of the two contracts. You will indicate your choice on the sheet of paper which
states the offer and return it to the experimenter.
Your choice will determine what the firm owes you. Your personal payoff for the round, therefore,
will consist of whatever money the firm owes you, plus the mug (if you had decided to accept the contract
that gave you a mug.)
You will play eight rounds of this experiment (in addition to two practice rounds), for a total of
approximately one hour. The terms of the contracts you are offered will vary from round to round, and do
not depend on anything that happened in any previous round. Your additional compensation for
participating in the experiment (if any) will be based on the outcome of one out of the eight rounds of the
experiment. In particular, at the end of the experiment the experimenter will use a random process to
determine which of the eight rounds counts for everyone. You will then be paid whatever you earned in
that round. For example, if the random process were to select round 1 and if in round 1 you had rejected
the firm’s contracts, your payoff would consist of nothing, so your total compensation would be your $5
initial payment. Alternatively, if the random process were to select round 4, and if in round 4 you had
agreed to a contract paying you a flat wage of $2 and a mug, your total compensation would be $7
(=$5+$2) plus the mug. Alternatively, if the random process were to select round 2, and if in round 2 you
had agreed to a contract paying you a wage of $8 and no mug, your total compensation would be $13
(=$5+$8) and no mug.
4. Exchange value Experiment: Endowed Subjects
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be given a USC mug, which can be purchased at the
campus bookstore.
****
The central purpose of the experiment is to examine decision making by managers of corporations.
You are to assume that you are being recruited by a large consumer marketing firm, Amalgamated Products
Corporation, which is seeking a manager for a new marketing project. Amalgamated will offer to pay you
for your managerial services.
In each round of the experiment, a representative from Amalgamated Products will give you a
proposal to work for the firm as a manager during that round. The proposal will give you a choice of one
of two employment contracts. The two contracts will differ in the monetary amount offered, depending
on whether or not you agree to contribute your mug to the firm when you go work for it. Specifically, the
firm will offer you $2 to work for the firm if you retain your mug; the firm will offer you a higher wage
if you agree to work for them and contribute your mug to the firm, with the amount ranging from $3 to $15.
All offers are made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. There is no bargaining.
Thus, you have three choices. You may reject both contracts and refuse to work for the firm for
that round. If you do this the round will end immediately for you, and your payoff for that round will
consist of nothing. (Be aware, however, that a rejected offer still “counts” as one of the rounds you played).
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Alternatively, you may agree to work for the firm and accept one of the two contracts. You will indicate
your choice on the sheet of paper which states the offer and return it to the experimenter.
You will
indicate your choice on a sheet of paper which you will return to the experimenter. Your choice will
determine what the firm owes you for that round. Your personal payoff for the round, therefore, will
consist of whatever money the firm owes you, plus the mug (if you had decided to accept the $2 wage
contract and retain your mug.)
You will play eight rounds of this experiment (in addition to two practice rounds), for a total of
approximately one hour. [Similar instructions to those above follow].
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FIGURE 1: RATE AT WHICH CONTROL GROUP OPTS FOR MONEY OVER MUG
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Figure 2: Rate at which Agency Condition Subjects Opt for Money over Mug
(Horizontal axis denotes [wh - wl ])
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Figure 3: Comparing Control Subjects to Agency Subjects
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Figure 4: Rate at which Exchange value Subjects Opt for Money over Mug
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